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Introduction
Let us start with some cryptographic motivation. The RSA function 10] is de ned as f(x) x e (mod n). Here n is usually taken of the form n = pq where p and q are two large primes and e is an integer relatively prime to (p ; 1)(q ; 1) . Using these parameters the function is 1 ; 1 when restricted to 1 x n (x n) = 1. Furthermore the function is widely believed to bea trapdoor function i.e. given n and e it is easy to compute f(x) and given f(x) it is also easy to recover x provided one has some secret information but otherwise it is di cult to compute x. In this case the secret information is the factorization of n.
The RSA function can be used to construct a deterministic Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) in the following way:
Each user B in a communication network chooses two large primes p and q and multiplies them together and publishes the result n B together with a numbere B which is relatively prime to (p ; 1)(q ; 1). He keeps the factorization of n B as his private secret information. If any user A in the system wants to send a secret message m to another user B she retrieves B's published information computes y m e B (mod n B ) and sends y to B. B now obtains the original message using his secret information, while somebody who does not know the secret information presumably faces an intractable computational task.
Public Key Cryptosystems are di erent and more complex objects than trapdoor functions. The reason is that a PKC involves a protocol consisting of several steps. For example the use of RSA in a PKC may present obstacles that did not occur when we considered it as a trapdoor function. Several people (including Blum, Lieberherr and Williams) have observed the following possible attack. Assume that 3 is chosen as the exponent and that A w ants to send the same message m to users U 1 U 2 and U 3 . She will compute and send y i m 3 (mod n i ) i = 1 2 3. If someone gains access to y 1 ,y 2 and y 3 then by using the fact that n 1 n 2 and n 3 will berelatively prime he can combine the * Supported by an IBM fellowship, partially supported by NSF grant DCR-8509905 1 messages by c hinese remaindering to get m 3 (mod n 1 n 2 n 3 ) and since m 3 < n 1 n 2 n 3 he can recover m. In general if the exponent is e the numberof messages needed is e.
A natural question is therefore: Is there a better way to send the same message to many people using this PKC?
A common heuristic tells us to use a \time stamp". Instead of sending the same message m to everybody one attaches the time and thus sends the encryption of 2 jt i j m+t i where 2 jt i j m is the shifted message and t i is the time when the message is sent to user U i . This time will bedi erent for the di erent receivers. The previous attack then fails.
If we assume that the times t i are known to the cryptanalyst we are led to consider the following computational problem (for e = 3).
Given (a i m + b i ) 3 (mod n i ) where all the a i and b i are known is it possible to recover m in polynomial time?
We will prove in section 3 that the answer is YES if the numberof similar messages is at least 7. In fact we will prove this as a special case of our main result, which is: Given a set of k polynomial equations P i (x) 0 (mod n i ) i = 1 : : : k each of degree d, it is possible to recover all solutions in time polynomial in both k and log n i if k
2 . Observe that the described attack does not work if the values of the t i are not known to the cryptanalyst. Thus if for instance a random padding was used or if the time stamp was unknown then the present attack will not work. However, this weakness seems severe enough that if one uses RSA as a PKC then as a matter of prudence one should use a large exponent or even better one should use a probabilistic encryption scheme 3], 7] based on RSA. By 1], 3] this can bedone with as much e ciency as in the deterministic case.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we state some results from geometry of numbers which will be needed in later sections. In section 3 we state and prove our main result and in section 4 we derive some cryptographic applications.
Background from geometry of numbers.
The main tool in our algorithm will bethe use of lattices and in this section we will gather the relevant background information. A lattice L is de ned to bethe set of points L = fy j y = P n i=1 a ibi a i 2Z g whereb i are linearly independent vectors in R n . The setb i is called a basis for the lattice and n is the dimension. The determinant of a lattice is de ned to be the absolute value of the determinant of the matrix with rowsb i . It is not hard to see that the determinant is independent of the choice of basis. The length of the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice is denoted by 1 . Let us recall the following well known fact:
Theorem: (Minkowski) 1 1 2 n (det(L)) 1 n where n is Hermite's constant. Hermite's constant is not known exactly for n > 8 but Minkowski,s convex body theorem ( 5] , ix.7) implies that n n. Lenstra This gives an e ective variant of Minkowski's theorem. Here kbk is the euclidean length of the vectorb. The bound on the running time assumes that multiplication of r bit numbers are done by classical arithmetic taking O(r 2 ) steps. Using faster multiplication routines the bounds can beimproved by a factor close to n log B. Armed with this information we return to the original problem.
Main Theorem
Let us start by xing some notation. Let N = Q k i=1 n i and n = min n i . Now we can state the problem formally:
Problem: Given a set of k equations P d j=0 a ij x j 0 (mod n i ) , i = 1 : : : k . Suppose that the system have a solution x < n and the numbers n i are pairwise relatively prime.
Can we nd such a solution e ciently?
Before we state our main result let us give the basic ideas. De ne u j < N to bethe chinese remaindering coe cients i.e. u j ij (mod n i ) ( ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise). We can combine the equations to a single equation using the chinese remainder theorem. 0 In other words x solves the equation over the integers and to prove the lemma we just need the fact that we can solve polynomial equations over the integers quickly. Since we are in the special case that we are looking for an integer solution we can proceed as follows. Find all linear factors modulo a small prime. Now apply Hensel lifting to obtain these factors modulo a large power of the prime and nally check if any of the roots is a root over the integers. The estimate for the running time in the lemma is correct but not the bestpossible.
The condition of Lemma 1 is quite unlikely to be ful lled when we start with a general set of equations. In spite of this Lemma 1 will beone of our main tools for proving our main result, which is as follows. Proof: The idea is to use Lemma 1. However as we remarked it is quite unlikely that it will apply to our equations directly. However we h a ve an extra degree of freedom. We can multiply the equation by an arbitrary constant S and we still get a valid equation. Using this trick w e will beable to make the coe cients small. Thus we want to make S c i (mod N) less than N n i ( We have only one term in the expansion of the determinant and we get
Using the theorem of LLL in section 2 w e know that we can nd a vectorb in L that satis es
As observed above to get the desired bound for the coe cients we need kbk < N d+1 and thus we need 2
Raising both sides to the d + 2 p o wer and rearranging we see that this is equivalent t o t h e condition in the theorem.
To nish the proof we need to prove that we have at least one nonzero coe cient.
Since kbk < N d+1 we see by looking at the last coordinate that the coe cient S multiplying b 1 satis es jSj < N . Further we know that S 6 = 0 since all nonzero vectors with S = 0 are of length at least N. This means that there is an n i such that S 6 0 (mod n i ). Look at the equation modulo this n i . Using that gcd(ha ij i d j=0 n i ) = 1 we see that the equation is nontrivial. The bottleneck in the computation is the lattice computation and this gives the running time of the algorithm.
Remark:
One interesting open question is whether we can solve the problem with fewer equations. It does not seem possible to use this line of attack with substantially fewer equations. To see this one might argue as follows:
The probability that jc j j < N (d+1)n j for j = 0 1 : : : d for a xed S is approximately n ;d(d+1)=2 and this would indicate that we should have n d(d+1)=2 di erent S to choose between and therefore need at least d(d + 1 ) =2 equations.
Cryptographic Applications
We get some immediate applications of the main theorem.
Application 1: Sending linearly related messages using RSA with low exponent e is insecure. Sending more than e(e+1) 2 messages enables an adversary to recover the messages provided that the moduli n i satisfy n i > 2
.
Proof: Suppose we are given the encryption of k linearly dependent messages. We expand the eth power and we get k equations of degree e with the di erent moduli used n i . We now apply the main theorem. We need to verify that the conditions of the main theorem are satis ed. If one of the gcd conditions is not satis ed we can factor one of the n i and that way obtain the message. Finally
(e + 1 )
and hence we can apply our main theorem. If one is prepared to do computation which is exponential in the number of equations one can attack the cryptosystem also given exactly e(e+1) 2 messages. The way to proceed is to use almost the same lattice. The only di erence is to replace the last coordinate of the rst vector by 2 e+2 4 . Now the algorithm of LLL nds a vector in the lattice of length at most N2 e+2 4 . This implies in particular that c i < N 2 e+2 4 n ;i . Now it is no longer possible to conclude that x solves the equation over the integers but we know that the right hand side is a multiple of N not exceeding e2 
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Another way of encrypting messages was proposed by Rabin 9] . He uses f(x) x 2 (mod n) where also here n is chosen to be a speci c composite number for each user. Using the same methods we get: Application 2: Sending linearly related messages using the Rabin encryption function is insecure. If 3 such messages are sent it is possible to retrieve the message in polynomial time.
Broder and Dolev proposed a protocol for ipping a coin in a distributed system 4]. Two of their essential ingredients were Shamir's method of sharing a secret 11] and the use of a deterministic PKC. The secret they use is the constant coe cient of a polynomial of degree t over a nite eld. The secret is distributed by evaluating the polynomial at a given set of points. It is easy to see that t + 1 pieces each consisting of the value of the polynomial at a point are enough to get the secret back while t pieces are not su cient to determine the polynomial. Broder and Dolev claim that t pieces are insu cient to nd the secret even in the presence of the encryption of other pieces. This is not correct if the cryptosystem used is RSA with small exponent. This is because when knowing t pieces the secret enters linearly in the remaining pieces and hence we can use Application 1. Finally we remark that there does not seem to be any w ay to extend the above attack to RSA with large exponent. The reason is that the integers involved are too big even to write down. There is still a large amount of structure present and it would beinteresting to investigate whether this structure could be exploited to yield a successful cryptanalytic attack on RSA with large exponent.
